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FAMILY LAW-LYING ABOUT A SPOUSE'S ADULTERY
TO SPEED UP A DIVORCE DOES NOT PREVENT A SUIT
TO ENFORCE THE SPOUSE'S PROMISE TO PAY
SUPPORT. Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d
510 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
This note examines "yet another case which has its genesis in
the disintegration of the respective parties' marital relationship."'
Marriage is an American institution-nearly all Americans will marry
at some point in their lives. 2 Not surprisingly, the United States has
consistently produced one of the highest marriage rates in the world.'
However, statistics also show that the United States possesses the
highest divorce rate of any industrialized nation.4 Based on recent
divorce rates in America, the chances of a first marriage ending in
divorce are about one in two.5
1. Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 298, 624 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1993),
rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
2. Id. at 43. For example, 95 percent of men born in 1945 have married at least
once. Id.
3. Constance Sorrentino, The Changing Family in International Perspective,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 1990, at 43. In 1960, 14.1 out of every 1000
Americans between the ages of 15-64 married. Id. at 44. This was second only
to Japan (14.5 marriages per 1000) and slightly ahead of Germany (13.9
marriages per 1000). Id. By 1970 the United States boasted a marriage rate of
17.0 per 1000, the world's highest. Id. The Netherlands was second at 15.2
per 1000. Id. Japan, meanwhile, had slipped to third (14.4 marriages per 1000).
Id. By 1980 the U.S. marriage rate had declined to 15.9 per 1000; however, it
was still the world leader, boasting a rate well ahead of Canada's (11.6
marriages per 1000) and the United Kingdom's (11.6 marriages per 1000). Id.
Japan, in contrast, had plummeted to 9.8 marriages per 1000. Id. Statistics
for 1986 showed the United States on top with a rate of 15.1 per 1000, easily
outdistancing the United Kingdom (10.6 marriages per 1000), Canada (10.2
marriages per 1000) and Japan (8.6 marriages per 1000). Id.
4. Id. at 41. Looking at statistics for 1986, the divorce rate per 1000 married
women in United States was 21.2. Id. at 44. Canada and the United Kingdom
stood second among industrialized nations at 12.9 per 1000. Id. Denmark was
next at 12.8 per 1000, followed by Sweden at 11.7 per 1000. Id. Japan's rate
was only 5.4 per 1000. Id.
5. Id. In the United States in 1993, there were 2,334,000 marriages, and 1,187,000
divorces. Thus, the total number of divorces was slightly more than half the
total number of marriages. See Sharman Stein, Marriage in the '90s: Ties Seem
a Bit Likelier to Bind, Cm. Tsm., Jan. 8, 1995, at Cl.
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Mark Reynolds Schneider and Janet Marie Schneider were mar-
ried for almost a quarter of a century when Mark abruptly moved
out of their marital home in July of 1990.6 For all intents and
purposes, their marriage was over, and divorce was soon to follow.7
For Mark, however, divorce could not come soon enough." In order
to obtain the quickest divorce possible, 9 Mark convinced Janet to lie
about catching him in bed with another woman. 0
Shortly after the divorce decree was entered," Mark stopped
making support payments to Janet and removed her as the beneficiary
on his two life insurance policies.' 2 Janet then sued to enforce Mark's
promise to pay spousal support. 3 The Circuit Court for Frederick
County dismissed Janet's complaint because her perjury in the divorce
proceedings gave her "unclean hands.' ' 4 The Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland affirmed the dismissal. 5 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, however, in Schneider v. Schneider, 6 reversed the court
of special appeals's decision and held that Janet should have been
allowed to present evidence that she was not in pari delicto7 with
6. Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 298, 624 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1993),
rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Mark told Janet that he "wanted a fast divorce because he did not want to
waste another 18 months of his life .... " Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md.
500, 504, 644 A.2d 510, 512 (1994).
9. Mark told Janet that "the only way to obtain a fast divorce would be on the
ground of adultery." Id. Mark was correct in his assertion. In Maryland,
adultery is the only grounds for an immediate absolute divorce. All other
grounds require a waiting period of at least 12 months. MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 7-103(a) (1991).
10. Schneider, 355 Md. at 504, 644 A.2d at 512. In her Complaint for Absolute
Divorce, Janet claimed that she had returned home from church to find Mark
in bed with a blonde-haired woman. Id. The couple committed perjury when,
under oath, Mark admitted to adultery and Janet corroborated his testimony.
Id. at 505, 644 A.2d at 513; see also infra note 158 and accompanying text.
11. The divorce decree was entered on August 31, 1990, fewer than seven weeks
after Mark moved out of the marital home. Schneider, 335 Md. at 505, 644
A.2d at 513.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 506, 644 A.2d at 513. Janet alleged that a letter Mark left her shortly
after they separated constituted a contract to pay spousal support. Id. at 504,
644 A.2d at 512. The letter read in part: "I could send you $400.00 or $500.00
every two week[s] 24 times a year or $10,000.00+ per year as long as you
need it or more." Id.
14. Id. at 502, 644 A.2d at 511; see also infra note 19 and accompanying text.
15. Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 298, 624 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1993),
rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
16. 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
17. Id. at 503, 644 A.2d at 514. The Latin translation of "in pari delicto" means
"in equal fault." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). The term is
taken from the Latin phrase, "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis,"
Schneider v. Schneider
Mark when they perjured themselves for the purpose of obtaining a
speedy divorce. 8
II. BACKGROUND
"He who comes into equity must come with clean hands."'
9
This maxim means that a court of equity will refuse to aid any
plaintiff who is guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in the
matter in which he seeks relief. 20 Thus, a plaintiff who comes into
court with "unclean hands," that is, tarnished by his own unlawful
or inequitable conduct in the subject matter of the complaint, will
be denied relief. The doctrine of unclean hands is as equally appli-
cable to family law litigation as it is to all other forms of equity
litigation.
2'
Recently, in Manown v. Adams 22 the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland summarized the state of the law regarding the unclean
hands doctrine. 23 In Manown, appellant Stephen Adams had recently
separated from his wife and was in difficult financial straits. 24 After
the separation, but before the divorce was final, Adams commenced
both a personal and a business relationship with Patricia Manown
25
and invested significant financial assets into their ventures. 6 Attempt-
ing to hide these assets from the court, Adams titled the transferred
meaning that in the case of equal fault, the position of the party defending
(or in possession) is the better one. Id. Put another way, where the fault is
mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it. Id.
18. Schneider, 335 Md. at 513, 644 A.2d at 517.
19. See generally 30A C.J.S. Equity § 102 (1992) (citing Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945)).
20. Id.
21. J. FADER & R. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAmiLY LAW § 23.21.1 (Supp. 1993); see
Pratt v. Pratt, 245 Md. 716, 717, 228 A.2d 611, 612 (1967) (finding neither
party entitled to a divorce under the "clean hands" doctrine); McClees v.
McClees, 162 Md. 70, 80-81, 158 A. 349, 353 (1932) (denying relief to husband
because deserting wife's offer to return was improperly conditioned); Childs v.
Childs, 49 Md. 509, 513 (1878) (finding that husband could not successfully
solicit relief through divorce when ill treatment which formed basis of his claim
resulted from his own misconduct). But see Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md.
168, 175, 63 A.2d 743, 746 (1949) (finding clean-hands maxim inapplicable in
suit to annul a bigamous marriage).
22. 89 Md. App. 503, 598 A.2d 821 (1991), vacated, 328 Md. 463, 615 A.2d 611
(1992). See infra note 31 for an explanation of why the case was vacated.
23. Id. at 511-13, 598 A.2d at 824-26.
24. Id. at 506, 598 A.2d at 822.
25. Id. at 506-07, 598 A.2d at 822-23.
26. Id. at 507-08, 598 A.2d at 822-23. For example, Adams gave Manown $43,000
to use as a downpayment on a house they purchased together. Id. at 503, 598
A.2d at 323. According to Adams's amended complaint, he transferred no less
than $97,307.29 to Manown and their business enterprise, North Star, a
publishing company which produced for sale such items as post cards and
calendars. Id. at 507-08, 598 A.2d at 822-23.
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assets in Manown's name only. 27 After his divorce was final, Adams
filed a petition for personal bankruptcy and received his discharge
three months later. 28 None of the assets transferred from Adams to
Manown were identified as property of Adams's estate in either the
divorce or the bankruptcy proceedings. 29 The relationship between
Adams and Manown turned sour shortly after the discharge in
bankruptcy, and Adams filed suit to recover the transferred funds.30
The court applied the unclean hands doctrine and barred Adams
from recovering the funds in which he had denied any interest during
the previous two proceedings." In doing so, the court emphasized
that the unclean hands doctrine "refuses recognition and relief from
the courts to those guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct per-
taining to the matter in which relief is sought.
' 3 2
The unclean hands doctrine was created to protect the courts,
not the parties to a suit.33 The theory is that "judicial integrity is
endangered when judicial powers are interposed to aid persons whose
very presence before a court is the result of some fraud or inequity. '3 4
Courts seek to deter such fraudulent conduct by leaving the parties
without a remedy against each other. 5 Thus, a court that invokes
the doctrine will "literally wash its hands of the affair, leaving the
guilty party or parties to the consequences of their actions. 3 6 The
decision to invoke the doctrine lies within the trial court's discretion.3 7
27. Manown v. Adams, 89 Md. App. at 508, 598 A.2d at 823. Both the joint
business venture and the house were titled solely in Manown's name. Id.
28. Id. at 507, 598 A.2d at 823.
29. Id. at 508, 598 A.2d at 823.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 516, 598 A.2d at 827. The court of appeals subsequently vacated the
case "on a totally different issue, i.e., 'that the trustee in bankruptcy, and not
[Adams, was] the real party in interest as plaintiff."' Adams v. Manown, 328
Md. 463, 483, 615 A.2d 611, 621 (1992) (Chasanow, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Adams, 328 Md. at 465-66, 615 A.2d at 612).
32. Manown, 39 Md. App. at 511, 598 A.2d at 824 (citing Hlista v. Altevogt, 239
Md. 43, 48, 210 A.2d 153, 156 (1965)); see also infra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
33. Manown, 89 Md. App. at 511, 593 A.2d at 824 (citing Niner v. Hanson, 217
Md. 298, 309, 142 A.2d 798, 803 (1958)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 511, 598 A.2d at 825 (quoting Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513, 533-34
(1875)). "In the early 20th century, it was argued that, by refusing any
affirmative judicial relief . . . there [would] be less of an incentive to engage
in such socially reprehensible conduct." Note, Illicit Cohabitation of Parties
as Affecting Contracts Made Between Them, 2 MD. L. REv. 291, 298 (1938).
36. Manown, 89 Md. App. at 511, 598 A.2d at 825.
37. Id. at 511-12, 598 A.2d at 825 (citing Space Aero Prods. Co. v. Darling, 238
Md. 93, 120, 208 A.2d 74, 88 (1965)). "The maxim gives wide range to [an]
equity court's use of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant. Any
[willful] act concerning the cause of action which . . . transgress[es] equitable
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Although it reversed Manown on other grounds," the Court of
Appeals of Maryland emphasized that the fraudulent conduct had to
be linked somehow to the matter before the court.3 9
It is only when the plaintiff's improper conduct is the
source, or part of the source, of his equitable claim, that
he is to be barred because of this conduct. What is material
is not that the plaintiff's hands are dirty, but that he dirties
them in acquiring the right he now asserts. 40
Quite simply, a court will refuse to apply the unclean hands doctrine
when the claim is not predicated upon the plaintiff's wrongdoing. 4
Furthermore, "it is an accepted rule that if the alleged wrongful
conduct of a complainant appears not to have injured the defendant,
the maxim cannot be successfully invoked." ' 42 In Thomas v. Klemm, 43
appellant William Thomas agreed to purchase property from Dorothy
Warren for $4,250." Warren's father, Francis Klemm, acted as
standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the application of the maxim .... "
Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md. 136, 142, 43 A.2d 193, 197 (1945) (citing Schaeffer
v. Sterling, 176 Md. 553, 6 A.2d 254 (1939)).
38. Adams, 328 Md. at 483, 615 A.2d at 621.
39. Id. at 475, 615 A.2d at 617. Thus, there must be a "nexus" between the
misconduct and the transaction at issue. Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App.
296, 306, 624 A.2d 1319, 1324 (1993), rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510
(1994); see also Bland v. Larsen, 97 Md. App. 125, 138, 627 A.2d 79, 85
(1993).
40. Manown, 328 Md. at 476, 615 A.2d at 617 (quoting D. Dobbs, Remedies §
2.4, at 46 (1973)).
41. Niner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298, 310, 142 A.2d 798, 804 (1958). "While equity
does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives as to other
matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or
deceit as to the controversy in issue." Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md. 136, 142,
43 A.2d 193, 197 (1945); see also Pennington v. Pennington, 390 So. 2d 809,
810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding unclean hands doctrine inapplicable
because husband's failure to pay child support through the court did not justify
wife's refusal to convey deed to marital home); Sparks v. Sparks, 353 S.E.2d
508, 510 (Ga. 1987) (finding that doctrine of unclean hands did not bar
husband, who transferred title of residence to wife during marriage for alleged
purpose of shielding residence from judgment creditor, from seeking equitable
division of residence); Bland v. Larsen, .97 Md. App. 125, 138, 627 A.2d 79,
85 (1993) (finding the requisite nexus lacking between wife's alleged perjury
and husband's duty to support his children); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 570
N.Y.S.2d 333, 334-35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (concluding that defendant's claim
that plaintiff embezzled funds did not bar plaintiff's right to partition); Agati
v. Agati, 461 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding unclean hands
doctrine inapplicable to husband who sought to enforce divorce decree requiring
ex-wife to deliver deed to former marital home because husband failed to
comply with part of decree requiring him to provide health insurance).
42. Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md. 136, 142, 43 A.2d 193, 197 (1945).
43. 185 Md. 136, 43 A.2d 193 (1945).
44. Id. at 138, 43 A.2d at 195.
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Warren's attorney and agent. 45 Thomas, who was employed as a
certified public accountant, told Klemm that he had no cash to
deposit but that he expected to receive a $500 bonus from his firm.4
Klemm promised to obtain a mortgage for $3,500 and to accept $500
in cash along with a note for the balance of the purchase price and
settlement expenses.47 When Warren delivered the deed, Thomas
informed her that he did not receive a bonus but that he had executed
a $3,500 mortgage with a bank. 48 Warren accepted a judgment note
for the balance of the purchase price and settlement expenses.
49
Thomas later sustained injuries in an automobile accident and
lost his job.50 Consequently, he was unable to make mortgage pay-
ments, and he reconveyed the property to Warren.5' Thomas later
filed suit both for an equitable accounting of Warren's interest in
the property and to have the deed declared to be a mortgage.52
Warren invoked an unclean hands defense and alleged that Thomas
had deceived Klemm by giving greater assurance of the possibility of
receiving the bonus than actually existed.5 3 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, however, refused to conclude that Thomas defrauded
Klemm merely because he expressed a belief that he would receive a
bonus from his company. 4 Moreover, the court noted, Warren had
been willing to accept the judgment note and did not suffer any loss
as a result of Thomas's mistaken belief.55 Thus, Warren could not
successfully use the doctrine of unclean hands as her defense.
"In pari delicto" is a corollary to the unclean hands doctrine.56
The term "pari delicto" is used to indicate a fraud committed by
both parties to the transaction.5 7 Thus, "equity will not relieve one







51. Id. at 138-39, 43 A.2d at 195.
52. Id. at 138, 43 A.2d at 195.
53. Id. at 141-42, 43 A.2d at 196-97.
54. Id. at 142, 43 A.2d at 197.
55. Id.
56. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 103 (1992). The unclean hands defense is invoked
when the plaintiff has committed misconduct in relation to the transaction. Id.
In pari delicto, in contrast, is invoked when both the plaintiff and the defendant
have committed misconduct in relation to the transaction. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 288 So. 2d 110, 119 (Ala. 1973) (holding
that plaintiff who fraudulently obtained land with help of defendant was in
pari delicto and was not entitled to relief); State v. Aamco Automotive
Transmissions, Inc., 199 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Minn. 1972) (barring franchisee
[Vol. 25
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words, when both parties are at fault, the law will not intervene.59
This concept was illustrated in Baxter v. Wilburn,6° where the
Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to enforce an agreement
between a man and his mistress that promoted unlawful cohabita-
tion.61 Pursuant to their arrangement, William Baxter, a married
man, purchased a home for Ruby Wilburn, his mistress.62 Baxter
conveyed the home to Wilburn in order to void his wife's marital
rights to it. 63 At the same time, Baxter sought to secure his own
interest in the property by having Wilburn execute a mortgage to
him. 64 The mortgage was not to be recorded unless Wilburn prede-
ceased Baxter. 65 Wilburn remained custodian of the mortgage6 and
tore it up when she became estranged from Baxter. 67 Baxter sued to
have a lien imposed on the property in the amount of the mortgage.
6
1
The trial court found that the transaction promoted their extra-
marital relationship and that, therefore, equity should not grant
relief.69 The Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously affirmed,
adding that the conveyance was not a gift to Wilburn completely
separate from the extramarital relationship. 0 Rather, the transaction
was an intimate part of the extramarital relationship and, in fact,
was designed to further it. 71 Therefore, the "connection between the
who knowingly and willingly used "bait and switch" techniques to maximize
sales and defraud customers from recovering damages against franchiser under
doctrine of in pari delicto, even though national franchiser forced franchisee
to use and pay for deceptive advertising and trained franchisee in such tech-
niques); Thigpen v. Kennedy, 238 So. 2d 744, 747 (Miss. 1970) (concluding
that the fact that plaintiff and defendant were in pari delicto did not entitle
plaintiff to have resulting trust imposed or to have defendant reconvey lots
that plaintiff had transferred to defendant for purpose of defrauding his wife
in divorce action); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1068 (N.J. Super.
1990) (holding that equity was an impermissible forum for division of marital
property purchased with funds obtained from illegal activities).
59. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 103 (1992); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th
ed. 1990) (citing the maxim "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis").
60. 172 Md. 160, 190 A. 773 (1937).
61. Id. at 164, 190 A. at 775.
62. Id. at 161, 190 A. at 774.
63. Id. at 161-62, 190 A. at 774.






70. Id. at 164, 190 A. at 775.
71. Id. The court assumed a direct connection between Baxter's purchase of the
house and his occupation of it with Wilburn. Id. at 163-64, 190 A. at 775.
The primary reason Baxter bought the house, in the court's eyes, was to
continue his adulterous relationship with Wilburn. Id. at 164, 190 A. at 775.
Thus, the court characterized the transaction as one in furtherance of the
parties' "illicit cohabitation." Id.
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immorality and the conveyance and agreement must . . . prevent the
court's interference. Equity must, in the words of many decisions,
leave the parties as they have left themselves.17 2 The court concluded
that the guilt in the arrangement was equal beyond question.73
Where "the parties are not in pari delicto, equity may, on
grounds of public policy and to prevent a greater wrong, extend
relief to one who is comparatively innocent. ' 74 In cases where there
are different degrees of guilt between parties to a fraudulent or illegal
transaction, a court will grant relief "if one party acts under circum-
stances of oppression, imposition, undue influence, or at a great
disadvantage . . . so that it appears that his guilt is subordinate to
that of the [other party]." 75
The Court of Appeals of Maryland articulated this concept as
far back as 1875, in the venerable case of Roman v. Mali.76 In an
attempt to avoid creditors after his coal company went bankrupt in
1854, Hippolyte Mali conveyed substantial assets to his attorney,
Philip Roman. 77 Under oath, both Mali and Roman denied that they
shared an attorney-client relationship and that Mali had any interest
in the property.7 8 Years later, after Roman had died, Mali sought to
have a trust imposed on the assets that Mali then testified had been
held by Roman for Mali's benefit. 79 Mali tried to avoid the in pari
delicto defense presented by Roman's estate by claiming that the
72. Id. at 164, 180 A. at 775.
73. Id.
74. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 112 (1992); see, e.g., Cooper v. Paris, 413 So. 2d
772, 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding investor who participated in
making illegal contract for sale of land not in pari delicto with unlicensed real
estate broker and, thus, entitled to refund of monies); McKinley v. Weidner,
698 P.2d 983, 986 (Ore. 1985) (holding that plaintiff was not in pari delicto
with defendant attorney who advised plaintiff to tender and dishonor check in
ploy to recover possession of boat from third party).
75. Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513, 532 (1875).
76. 42 Md. 513 (1875).
77. Id. at 541-42. Mali was a wealthy New York-based entrepreneur with personal
worth estimated between $100,000 and $200,000. Id. at 541. Mali, president
of Parker Vein Coal Company, was threatened with suits by certain stockholders
seeking to recover damages for over-issue of stock. Id. Roman, an attorney in
Allegany County, Maryland, was a director and attorney for Parker Vein Coal
Company. Id. at 541-42. Mali subsequently sold a one-half interest in a tract
of land he owned in Baltimore City and certain stock in the Parker Vein
Steamship Company to Otis Jewett for $75,000. Id. at 542. Jewett then
mortgaged the whole property to Mali, who, at the same time, assigned the
mortgage to Roman. Id. Jewett, meanwhile, conveyed his interest to his brother,
Clarence. Id. at 543. When the mortgage became due and was unpaid, Roman
convinced Clarence Jewett to convey his interest to Roman. Id.
78. Id. at 544-45.
79. Id. at 514-15.
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scheme to defraud creditors was Roman's creation ° and that Mali
perjured himself on the advice of counsel (Roman), in whom he
placed complete confidence."'
The trial court ruled in favor of Mali,8 2 but the Court of Appeals
of Maryland reversed and held that Mali was not less guilty in intent
and perpetration of the fraud than was Roman.83 Because the parties
were in pari delicto, the court withheld its aid.84 Although the court
was split 3-1-3, the three dissenters agreed with the majority that
equity should not deny relief unless the parties were in pari delicto s5
A plaintiff is not regarded as in pari delicto with the
defendant if, even though he knew or had reason to know
that the bargaining was illegal or immoral, he was induced
to participate in it by fraud or duress or by the use of
influence derived from superior knowledge, mental power,
or economic position.
8 6
In Maskell v. Hill,17 the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld this
exception to the in pari delicto maxim.88 Alexander Maskell, a married
man, and Bertha Kidd, his unmarried mistress, held themselves out
to the public as man and wife and lived together for approximately
three years in a residence they acquired, under false names, in 1937
and titled as tenants by the entireties.8 9 In 1941, about one year after
the parties had separated, Maskell forged a deed conveying the
falsely-titled property to himself under his real name. 90 Two years
later, Maskell conveyed the property to a strawman who subsequently
reconveyed the property to Maskell and his legal wife as tenants by
the entireties. 91 When Kidd, who had since married another man, 92
learned of these transactions, she filed suit to remove the cloud on
80. Id. at 526-27.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 514-15.
83. Id. at 531-32.
84. Id. at 532.
85. Id. at 554-55.
86. 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1537, at 826 (1962).
87. 189 Md. 327, 55 A.2d 842 (1947).
88. Id. at 337, 55 A.2d at 847.
89. Id. at 329-30, 55 A.2d at 843. Maskell and Kidd acquired title under the false
names of Harry A. Hill and Bertha V. Hill. Id. at 330, 55 A.2d at 843. Kidd
may have been induced to go along with this fraudulent transaction due to her
"inferior" economic position as Maskell's "wife." See id. at 329, 55 A.2d at
843.
90. Id. at 330, 55 A.2d at 843.
91. Id. at 331, 55 A.2d at 843.
92. Id. at 330, 55 A.2d at 843. Kidd married William Hill in the interim between
the end of her relationship with Maskell and the time she filed suit. Id. She
filed suit under her married name. Id.
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record title created by the forged deed and to obtain a sale in lieu
of partition. 93 Maskell demurred to Kidd's complaint and alleged that
public policy prevented the court from enforcing rights based on an
illicit cohabitation and, therefore, that a court of equity should refuse
to aid either party. 94 The trial court overruled Maskell's demurrer. 95
The Court of Appeals of Maryland sustained the order overruling
the demurrer. 96 The court reasoned that in either an action to remove
the cloud on Kidd's title or an action for sale in lieu of partition,
the illicit relations between Kidd and Maskell, as well as the immor-
ality of Kidd's past life, had no relevance to the title she acquired
in 1937 .97 The alleged forged deed was executed after the parties had
separated. 98 According to the court, "[n]either law nor morals would
be vindicated by permitting a man to steal his former mistress's
property by forgery perpetrated after all personal or property trans-
actions between them had come to an end." 99
"Even when the parties have been found to be in pari delicto,
relief is sometimes awarded if, in the particular case, public policy
is found to be best conserved by that course."'0 Relief, therefore,
would be awarded in a case where application of in pari delicto
would leave property in controversy in the hands of a person who
has no claim to it.' 0 ' In order to "determine whether, in a particular
case, the parties are equally at fault, it may be necessary to consider
whether the policy of the law would be better promoted by denying
recovery or by permitting recovery in whole or in part."' °2
Policy considerations formed the crux of the Court of Appeals
of Maryland's decision in Cronin v. Hebditch.103 In Cronin, the court
nullified a separation agreement between newlyweds Louise and John
Hebditch.' ° When the couple married in 1948, Louise was eighteen,
and John was seventy-one. 05 Four months after the wedding, Louise
93. Id. at 331, 55 A.2d at 843-44.
94. Id. at 331-32, 55 A.2d at 844.
95. Id. at 332, 55 A.2d at 844.
96. Id. at 337, 55 A.2d at 847.
97. Id. at 335, 55 A.2d at 845-46.
98. Id. at 335, 55 A.2d at 846.
99. Id. at 335-36, 55 A.2d at 846.
100. See generally 30A C.J.S. Equity § 112 (1992).
101. Id.; see also Bizuk v. Bizuk, 111 N.E.2d 823, 830, reh'g denied, 112 N.E.2d
760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1953) ("Even if ... the parties were in pari delicto . . .it
would be inequitable, unjust and contrary to public policy to permit appellee
to use that doctrine as a sword to retain all of the property he received pursuant
to an illegal agreement.").
102. Cronin v. Hebditch, 195 Md. 607, 619, 74 A.2d 50, 55 (1950).
103. 195 Md. 607, 74 A.2d 50 (1950).
104. Id. at 620, 74 A.2d at 55.
105. Id. at 610, 74 A.2d at 51.
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returned to her parents' home and filed a bill for separate mainte-
nance and alimony, alleging cruelty.' ° Prior to any decree, the couple
executed a separation agreement under which John would pay Louise
$1000 when the divorce decree was signed and $8000 thereafter in
ten annual installments of $800.107 In addition, Louise waived all her
rights to her husband's property and estate.108 When John died the
following year, an absolute divorce had yet to be granted.' °9 Louise
brought suit to enforce her rights as his widow." 0 Representatives of
John's estate argued that Louise should be denied relief because,
even if the separation agreement were unlawful, Louise was a party
to the contract, and was therefore in pari delicto."'
The Court of Appeals of Maryland called the contract "a
palpably unlawful agreement to obtain a divorce and to pay $9,000
for it, $1,000 c.o.d., the balance in ten annual deferred payments.""' 2
Because the agreement mentioned no grounds for divorce and implied
that none existed, the court held that "the divorce bargained for
[was] therefore ... a fraudulent divorce."" 3
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, would not deny
Louise her marital rights because it found the agreement to be "an
unjust device to deprive the wife of her marital rights without any
consideration at all unless the divorce were obtained. ' "1 4 The court
concluded that "the policy of the law would be better promoted by
giving [Louise] her marital rights than by consummating the unjust
purpose of the agreement by declaring her rights lost.""' 5
Courts may also weigh competing policies against each other. In
Pratt v. Pratt,' 6 a divorce was denied to the parties because neither
party had "clean hands.""' 7 The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
however, did not disturb the trial court's child custody award to the
wife," '8 despite the fact that she committed adultery and perjured
106. Id. at 610-11, 74 A.2d at 51.
107. Id. at 611-12, 74 A.2d at 51-52.
108. Id. at 611, 74 A.2d at 51. From the time of his engagement to Louise until
the time of his death, John Hebditch was worth over $700,000. Id. at 612, 74
A.2d at 52. Louise, on the other hand, held no property of her own at the
time of the marriage, held no separate property at the time of John's death,
and held no property jointly or by the entireties with John. Id. at 610, 74
A.2d at 51.
109. Id. at 610-12, 74 A.2d 51-52.
110. Id. at 614-15, 74 A.2d at 53.
111. Id. at 618-19, 74 A.2d at 55.
112. Id. at 618, 74 A.2d at 55.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 619, 74 A.2d at 55.
115. Id. at 619-20, 74 A.2d at 55.
116. 245 Md. 716, 228 A.2d 611 (1967) (per curiam).
117. Id. at 717, 228 A.2d at 612.
118. Id. at 719, 228 A.2d at 613.
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herself on the witness stand. 1 9 In Pratt, the court apparently deemed
the policy of awarding custody based on the best interest of the child
a more important policy than denying equitable relief based on
perjury. Similarly, in DuPont v. DuPont,2' a case in which a wife
committed perjury during a trial for separate maintenance and sup-
port, the Delaware Supreme Court remarked: "While lying under
oath is a matter of the very gravest importance . . . it appears to us
to be extraneous to the issue as to how much money this husband
should provide for the support of his wife.'
' 2
A guilty party who is granted relief, either because he is not in
pari delicto or because public policy demands it, is often allowed
restitution or rescission, rather than specific performance of a con-
tract.123 A court will permit a plaintiff to disregard the contract and
will grant him either the right to take his property or money back
(rescission) or the right to the reasonable value of a performance
rendered by him and received by the defendant (restitution). 124 Thus,
the usual remedy for a person not in pari delicto to an illegal contract
is either restitution or rescission;' 21 specific performance would allow
a plaintiff to reap the full benefit of the illegal bargain.
2 6
A court of equity will not require specific performance as a
matter of course.127 It will evaluate the conduct of the parties, the
119. Id. at 718, 228 A.2d at 612.
120. Id. The court of appeals did not discuss the perjury issue in any detail. "In
considering the custody of the infant son the court must consider ... the
policies of the courts in this State against divided custody and, therefore, the
court feels that the best interest of this child will be served in granting custody
to the [wife]." Id. at 718, 228 A.2d at 613 (quoting the trial judge).
121. 103 A.2d 234 (Del. 1954).
122. Id. at 239.
123. 14A SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1631A, at
46-47 (Walter H.E. Jaeger, ed., 3d ed. 1972).
124. 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1535, at 822 (1962).
125. See, e.g., Messick v. Smith, 193 Md. 659, 69 A.2d 478 (1949) (holding builder
entitled to restitution for work done but not to recovery of full price bargained
for in illegal contract); Maskell v. Hill, 189 Md. 327, 55 A.2d 842 (1947)
(holding mistress entitled to rescission of forged deed and to restitution of
rents and profits from property); Lord v. Smith, 109 Md. 42, 71 A. 430 (1908)
(holding plaintiff, who did not place bank account in name of defendant in
order to defraud creditors, entitled to injunction prohibiting defendant from
interfering with business); see also DuPont v. DuPont, 103 A.2d 234 (Del.
1954) (holding that chancellor improperly lowered wife's maintenance award
due to unrelated misrepresentations).
126. The Schneider majority did not cite to a single case that permitted specific
performance of an illegal contract in similar circumstances. Schneider v.
Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 523, 644 A.2d 510, 521 (1994) (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting).
127. Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 296, 104 A.2d 573, 577 (1954); see also Lower
v. Lower, 584 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (.'[Slpecific performance
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circumstances, and the equities of each particular case.2 Further-
more, it will not use its discretion to grant the remedy unless its
exercise will serve the ends of justice and the result of its assistance
will be fair, just and reasonable.
1 29
Equity will exercise jurisdiction over separation agreements be-
tween husbands and wives (as in Schneider), and in appropriate cases,
it will specifically enforce payments of maintenance 3 ° from one
spouse to another. 3' Courts favor the enforcement of such agree-
ments as a matter of public policy. 3 2 If the support provisions of
an agreement are described as alimony,"3 however, they will not be
enforced in equity as a matter of course, except in those cases where
the agreement is incorporated in a judgment for alimony. 134
is an equitable remedy not available as a matter of course but only in unique
situations."') (citing Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 908 (Pa. 1979)); II
SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1418A (3d ed. 1968); MURRAY, ON CON-
TRACTS-A REVISITATION OF GRISMORE ON CONTRACTS § 183 (1974)); Schiff v.
Schiff, 283 A.2d 131, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) ("The remedy of
specific performance is not an absolute one.").
128. Zouck, 204 Md. at 285, 104 A.2d at 577; see also Schiff v. Schiff, 283 A.2d
131, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (noting that specific performance
is in large measure discretionary and rests on equitable principles to be applied
upon a consideration of all the circumstances of a particular case).
129. Zouck, 204 Md. at 296, 104 A.2d at 577-78; see also Anderson v. Anderson,
563 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) ("Specific performance is not a
remedy of legal right but rests in the sound discretion of the court . ").
130. "Maintenance" is shorthand for "separate maintenance," which refers to
money paid by one married person to the other for support if they are no
longer living as husband and wife. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (6th ed.
1990). If such money is paid under a court order, it is known as "alimony."
For further discussion, see infra note 133 and text accompanying notes 137-
39.
131. J. FADER & R. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 16.11 (1990). A court will
enforce those payments that are due and unpaid as well as those which are to
be paid in the future. Id. Generally speaking, courts do not decree specific
performance of agreements to pay money. However, an exception to this rule
exists in agreements between husband and wife for payment of alimony or
support. Williams v. Williams, 305 Md. 1, 8, 501 A.2d 432, 435 (1985) (citing
Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 292, 104 A.2d 573, 576 (1954)).
132. Williams, 305 Md. at 8, 501 A.2d at 435 (citing Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md.
285, 292-94, 104 A.2d 573, 577-78 (1954)).
133. The word "alimony" is derived from the Latin "alimonia," meaning sustenance
and traditionally refers to the sustenance or support of the wife by her divorced
husband. This stems from the common-law right of the husband to support
his wife. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 73 (6th ed. 1990). For additional discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
134. Williams, 305 Md. at 8, 501 A.2d at 435. In Brown v. Brown, 278 Md. 672,
366 A.2d 18 (1976), a wife sought specific enforcement of a clause in the
separation agreement which called for the husband to pay the wife $60.00 per
week "as alimony during the joint lives of the parties hereto so long as they
remain separate and apart, and the wife remains unmarried." Id. at 673-74,
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Maryland courts have always recognized a distinction between
alimony, which the court is empowered to award, 35 and contractual
spousal support, which the court could not grant but for the agree-
ment of the parties. 3 6 Historically, alimony was an award made by
the court for maintenance of the wife.' 37 Alimony was defined as
"the payment of money at stated periods for [the wife's] support
during the joint lives of the parties so long as they were separated."' 3
Despite the label given by the parties to a money allowance for the
support of a wife, such allowance "is not alimony unless it is payable
under a judicial decree and terminates on the death of the husband,
or the death or remarriage of the wife."' 13 9 Contractual spousal
support, on the other hand, may not be granted absent an enforceable
366 A.2d at 19-20 (emphasis added). The court of appeals denied enforcement
and stated: "No matter what the parties may call a money allowance for a
wife's support, it is not alimony unless it is payable under a judicial decree
and terminates on the death of the husband, or on the death or remarriage of
the wife." Id. at 675, 366 A.2d at 20 (citing LaChance v. LaChance, 28 Md.
App. 571, 575, 346 A.2d 676, 679-80 (1975)) (emphasis added).
135. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 11-101 (1991 & Supp. 1994); see also J. FADER
& R. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 16.10, at 359 (1990).
136. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-101(a) (1991); see also J. FADER & R. GILBERT,
MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 16.10, at 359 (1990). The distinction between alimony
(sometimes referred to as "technical alimony") and contractual spousal support
has lost much of its legal significance. Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App.
486, 497, 541 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1988). Before 1950, a spousal support agreement
that was made part of the divorce decree but that did not qualify as technical
alimony (an award the court would have had the power to make absent the
agreement) could not be enforced by imprisonment for contempt. Id. The
agreement could be enforced only by sequestration, execution, or attachment.
Id. At that time contractual spousal support was viewed solely as a contractual
debt rather than as an affirmative duty imposed by the court. Id. Furthermore,
because the spousal support was not alimony, it could not be modified by the
court. Id.
In 1950, an amendment to the Maryland Constitution (art. III, § 38) provided
that an agreement for alimony was not considered a debt. Id. at 497, 541 A.2d
at 1337. Later, the adoption of § 8-103 of the Family Law Article provided
for court modification of contractual spousal support that was not technical
alimony unless prohibited by the agreement itself. Id. Today, a spousal support
agreement cannot be enforced by imprisonment for contempt unless the spousal
support is ordered in the divorce decree. Id. at 497-98, 541 A.2d at 1337. If
the divorce decree does not contain an order for spousal support, the failure
to pay it will be regarded as a breach of contract. Id. at 498, 541 A.2d at
1337. In addition, if spousal support is not made part of the divorce decree it
cannot be modified after the judgment is entered because the court will not
retain jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
137. J. FADER & R. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 16.10, at 359 (1990).
138. Id. (citing Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 32, 48 A.2d 451, 457 (1946)).
139. Brown v. Brown, 278 Md. 672, 675, 366 A.2d 18, 20 (1976).
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contract between the parties. 40 Such agreements to pay spousal
support require consideration to be valid.1
4 '
A valid separation agreement calling for spousal support may
be either approved, incorporated or merged into a judgment of
divorce. 42 In a "merger," the agreement is absorbed into the judg-
ment and cannot be enforced separately. 43 An agreement that is
"incorporated" is considered part of the judgment, although it may
be separately enforced. 44 An "approved" agreement is one that has
been endorsed by the court. 45 It is not part of the agreement, and
it may be separately enforced.' s
III. THE INSTANT CASE
Janet and Mark Schneider were married in 1966.147 Mark "dom-
inated [Janet] throughout their marriage [and] completely controlled
the parties' finances."'' 48 He "not only dictated with respect to money
matters-his was the final word on children issues and on the matter
of what [Janet] did with her life.' ' 49 On July 15, 1990, after almost
a quarter-century of marriage, Mark moved out of the marital
home.'50 Four days later, when Mark returned to pick up some of
140. Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 496, 541 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1988);
see also Bellofatto v. Bellofatto, 245 Md. 379, 226 A.2d 313 (1967); Bebermeyer
v. Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 215 A.2d 463 (1965); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 234
Md. 462, 200 A.2d 42 (1964); Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387
(1928).
141. See Frank v. Frank, 203 Md. 361, 101 A.2d 224 (1953).





147. Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 503, 644 A.2d 510, 512 (1994). Janet
gave birth to two children, "a daughter in 1967 and a son in 1972." Schneider
v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 298, 624 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1993), rev'd, 335
Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994). The son was still a dependent minor at the
time Mark moved out of the family home. Schneider, 335 Md. at 519, 644
A.2d at 520.
148. Schneider, 335 Md. at 503, 644 A.2d at 512.
149. Id. For example, after Mark was diagnosed as a diabetic, in March of 1990,
he "insisted that [Janet] surrender her real estate license and her job selling
real estate [with a broker in Hagerstown] so that she would be able to ...
better care for [him]." Id. Then, in May of 1990, Mark "suddenly decided
that [Janet] needed to return to some job that would allow [her] to be home
when [he] needed her." Id. Janet took a job at a local McDonald's which
paid $5.00 per hour. Id. at 504-05, 644 A.2d at 512.
150. Id. at 504, 644 A.2d at 512. On that morning, according to Janet, Mark told
her to use the truck for transportation to work at McDonald's. Schneider v.
Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 301, 624 A.2d 1319, 1322 (1993). When Janet
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his belongings, he left a four-page, longhand letter which read, in
part: "I could send you $400.00 or $500.00 every two week[s] 24
times a year or $10,000.00+ per year as long as you need it or
more[.]"T '5 The theory of Janet's complaint for specific performance
was that this portion of the note constituted a contract to pay spousal
support. 1
5 2
Mark telephoned Janet two days later, on July 21, and told her
that he "wanted a fast divorce because he did not want to waste
another 18 months of his life [and] that the only way to obtain a
fast divorce would be on the ground of adultery.""' Later that
month, Mark met with Janet. He reaffirmed his promise to pay
spousal support and also told her that she would remain the primary
beneficiary on his two life insurance policies.1 4 In return, Janet
abstained from seeking alimony or other relief. 5 '
On August 7, 1990, Janet filed a Complaint for Absolute Di-
vorce, which described Mark's adultery. 5 6 In her Complaint, Janet
asked why, Mark replied that he was using the car to go find another place
to live. Id. At approximately noon that day, Mark appeared at the McDonald's
where Janet was working and told her that he had found a place to move
into. Id.
151. Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 504, 644 A.2d 510, 512 (1994).
152. Id.
153. Id. Adultery is grounds for an immediate absolute divorce. All other grounds
for absolute divorce require a waiting period of at least 12 months. MD. CODE
ANN., FAm. LAW § 7-103(a) (1991). Desertion must continue for 12 months
without interruption before the filing of an application for divorce. Id. § 7-
103(a)(2). Voluntary separation requires that the parties live separate and apart,
without cohabitation, for 12 months without interruption before filing an
application for divorce. Id. § 7-103(a)(3). Conviction for a felony or misde-
meanor in any state court is also grounds for an immediate absolute divorce
if the defendant has been sentenced to serve at least three years, or an
indeterminate length, in a penal institution and has served 12 months of the
sentence prior to the filing of an application for divorce. Id. § 7-103(a)(4). A
two-year separation where the parties have lived separate and apart, without
cohabitation, without interruption before the filing of an application for divorce
is also grounds for an immediate absolute divorce. Id. § 7-103(a)(5). The final
ground for an immediate absolute divorce is insanity, which requires that the
insane spouse be confined in a mental institution for at least three years prior
to the filing of an application for divorce. Id. § 7-103(a)(6).
154. Schneider, 335 Md. at 504-05, 644 A.2d at 512-13. Mark told Janet: "I've
already told you what I will do. You have it in writing." Id. at 505, 644 A.2d
at 512-13. The benefit under one life insurance policy was $100,000. Id. Under
the other policy, the benefit was twice Mark's salary. Id.
155. Id. at 505, 644 A.2d at 513.
156. Id. The complaint described the adulterous incident as follows:
On July 15, 1990, [Janet] went by herself to church as she ordinarily
does every Sunday. She left at the normal time, 8:00 AM, but returned
home somewhat early because there was a visiting priest. At approx-
imately 9:45 AM, she entered the bedroom she shared with [Mark).
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claimed that she had returned home from church to find Mark in
bed with a blonde-haired woman.' 7 Mark admitted to adultery and
Janet corroborated his testimony. 5 ' When the divorce decree was
entered, on August 31, 1990, the couple had been separated for less
than seven weeks. 159
Mark made two payments of $400 each to Janet in October
1990 and one payment of $400 the following month.'l 0 Thereafter,
Mark refused to make any further payments to Janet.' 6' He also
removed Janet as beneficiary on each life insurance policy. 62
On or about August 27, 1991, Janet, attempting to enforce
Mark's promises, filed two separate suits. 63 In her Motion to Revise
Judgment, Janet requested that the circuit court reopen the divorce
proceedings and award alimony.'" In her Complaint for Specific
Performance, Janet sought specific performance of Mark's financial
promises. 165 Both complaints were dismissed by the trial court under
the unclean hands doctrine,'" but Janet appealed only the dismissal
of her Complaint for Specific Performance.
67
She had in mind changing into her McDonald's uniform as she was
scheduled to begin work at McDonald's that morning at 11:00 AM.
She found [Mark] in bed with a blonde-haired woman. [Janet] was
flabbergasted, managed to say something like "[glet out of the house,"
and went downstairs. [Mark] came downstairs and stated that he
would be moving out. [Mark] left that day and never slept under the
roof of the marital home again.
Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 299, 624 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1993),
rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
157. Schneider, 335 Md. at 502, 644 A.2d at 511.
158. Id. at 505, 644 A.2d at 513. In Maryland, corroboration of a plaintiff's
testimony is required in order to obtain a judgment of divorce. MD. CODE
ANN., FAm. LAW § 7-101(b) (1991). A court may not enter a decree of divorce
on the uncorroborated testimony of the party who is seeking the divorce. Id.
159. Schneider, 335 Md. at 504-05, 644 A.2d at 512-13. Mark moved out of the
marital home on July 15, 1990. Id. at 504, 644 A.2d at 512. The divorce




163. Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 300, 624 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1993),
rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 300, 624 A.2d at 1321-22.
166. Id. at 302-03, 624 A.2d at 1322-23. With respect to Janet's Motion to Revise
Judgment, the trial judge remarked: I think the motion to dismiss properly
lies .... I think if there is any fraud that it's intrinsic fraud and in addition
to the intrinsic fraud, quite frankly, unclean hands is so applicable .... [T]he
basis for her getting that divorce was her perjured testimony, which she admits.
Id. at 302, 644 A.2d at 1322. In dismissing Janet's Complaint for Specific
Performance, the trial judge noted:
Janet Marie Schneider has admitted . . . that the divorce was granted
19951
Baltimore Law Review
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Janet
contended, inter alia, that there was an insufficient nexus between
her perjury and her action for specific performance. 168 The court
held otherwise and found that Janet had admitted the nexus when
she described her Complaint as "matrimonial" litigation. 69 More
importantly to the court, Janet admitted that the consideration given
in exchange for Mark's promise of payment was the act of perjury
itself-the prosecution of the divorce action.
70
Explaining that "the whole transaction (i.e., the perjury) from
beginning to end, appear[ed] to be the joint scheme of the two, the
one co-operating with the other, and both being equally guilty,"''
the court held that the unclean hands doctrine was properly invoked
because Janet's fraud was perpetrated exclusively against the court
and not against Mark.
7 2
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, reversed the lower
court's decision and concluded that it was not necessary to reach the
issue of whether the doctrine of unclean hands applied. Instead, the
court of appeals considered the policies underlying both the in pari
delicto rule and the enforcement of agreements for spousal support.
73
While acknowledging that an in pari delicto dismissal could be
avoided in cases of "oppression" or by "great disadvantage," the
to her on the grounds of adultery as a result of perjured testimony
by her .... In this case, the matters which the Plaintiff [Janet]
attempts to litigate in this matter could and should have been disposed
of in the divorce action. Where the Plaintiff obtained her divorce on
admittedly perjured testimony, this Court refuses to recognize her
action in this case under the doctrine of unclean hands.
Id. at 302-03, 624 A.2d at 1323.
167. Id. at 303 n.1, 624 A.2d at 1323 n.l.
168. Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 506-07, 644 A.2d 510, 513 (1994). Janet
also argued that: (1) dismissing a case at the pleadings stage due to unclean
hands was inappropriate, especially in "matrimonial" litigation; and (2) al-
though both she and Mark committed perjury, her perjury would not have
occurred but for Mark's oppressive will. Id.
169. Id. at 507, 644 A.2d at 514. Janet's counsel claimed: "Dismissing an action
on preliminary motion on the basis of the unclean hands is rarely appropriate.
This is particularly true in matrimonial litigation." Schneider, 96 Md. App. at
307-08, 624 A.2d at 1325. Janet's brief cited several law review articles as
support for this proposition. Id. However, the court of special appeals believed
that the cases cited were not on point. Id. Nevertheless, the court observed
that by citing to these articles, Janet acknowledged the obvious nexus between
her divorce and her complaint. Id. "[B]y describing her Complaint for Specific
Performance as part of a 'matrimonial action,' we believe that she is admitting
the undeniable nexus between the divorce proceeding (and, therefore her
perjury) and her Complaint for Specific Performance." Id.
170. Schneider, 335 Md. at 507-08, 644 A.2d at 514.
171. Schneider, 96 Md. App. at 312, 624 A.2d at 1327.
172. Id. at 312, 624 A.2d at 1328.
173. Schneider, 335 Md. at 509, 644 A.2d at 514.
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court held that Janet should be permitted to introduce evidence that
she was not in pari delicto.174 For support, the court noted that the
allegations in Janet's Complaint raised a factual question as to
whether the degree of Janet's guilt for the perjury in the divorce
case was as great as Mark's. 75 According to the court, the Complaint
showed a marriage in which Janet was economically dependent on
Mark, who made significant personal decisions for her and who
unilaterally made the pivotal decisions affecting their children.' 76
Janet also alleged that Mark conceived of and insisted on using
perjured grounds for divorce and that she initially resisted, but later
acquiesced, in the perjury. 7 7 The majority, therefore, allowed Janet
an opportunity, on remand, to prove that she was not in pari
delicto.178 If Janet were to succeed, she could demand specific per-
formance of the contract for spousal support and obtain the full
benefit of her bargain.
79
The majority also concluded that the dismissal of Janet's Com-
plaint would do little to discourage perjury in divorce actions. 80 In
the court's opinion, "any deterrence of perjury that might be effected
by refusing relief to Janet" was outweighed by the policy favoring
the enforcement of agreements for spousal support. 8' Under the facts
alleged, dismissal would be contrary to public policy because "dis-
missal would reward the perjury of economically superior spouses by
neutering their contractual obligations of support to economically
dependent spouses.' '182
Judge Chasanow, the sole dissenter, argued that there was not
an enforceable contract for post-divorce spousal support." 3 First, he
noted that there was no indication of how much of Mark's payments
were to be allocated for child support.'8 Therefore, Mark's $400 or
$500 every two weeks could not be a contract to pay a specific sum
for spousal support.'85 Second, Mark's letter made no mention of a
174. Id. at 513, 644 A.2d at 517.
175. Id. at 517, 644 A.2d at 519.
176. Id. at 513, 644 A.2d at 516.
177. Id. at 513, 644 A.2d at 516-17.
178. Id. at 513, 644 A.2d at 517.
179. Id. at 522, 644 A.2d at 521 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 518, 644 A.2d at 519.
181. Id. at 516, 644 A.2d at 518.
182. Id. at 518, 644 A.2d at 519.
183. Id. at 519, 644 A.2d at 520.
184. Id. (Chasanow, J., dissenting). The offer was apparently intended by Mark,
and assumed by Janet, also to include support for their son, who was still a
dependent minor. Id.
185. Id. at 519-20, 644 A.2d at 520. The letter mentioned support only in a generic
way ("$400 or $500 every two weeks"), with no specific amounts allocated
either to Janet or to their minor son. See id. at 519, 644 A.2d at 520. Janet
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divorce, and there was no clear indication that the pre-divorce support
payments were intended to continue after the divorce and to be
converted to permanent spousal support.8 6 Finally, Judge Chasanow
explained that the letter was merely a unilateral indication of what
Mark intended to do. 87 There was no consideration or mutual
promise by Janet which would, in Judge Chasanow's opinion, have
made this letter a contract. 8
Judge Chasanow conceded that if Janet were not in pari delicto,
she would have been entitled to restitution of what she gave up-
the right to present her claim for alimony. 8 9 Nevertheless, because
Janet did not appeal the dismissal of her Motion to Revise Judgment,
which would have reopened the divorce proceedings, Judge Chasanow
concluded that she had abandoned that option. 9'
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Schneider
v. Schneider, noted that because the perjury was an accomplished
fact and was limited to the grounds for a divorce which had already
been granted,' 91 the case was "somewhat analogous to Maskell fv.
Hill]. '192 By making this analogy, the Schneider court reasoned that
assumed that at least some of the money was allocated for child support, but
she could not establish with precision how much money was reserved for
spousal support. See id. at 520, 644 A.2d at 520. Because the letter did not
specify how much money was to be allocated for spousal support, it could
have been Mark's intention to devote the entire sum to child support. If that
were true, Janet would have had no claim. However, Mark could have intended
that some of the money (say $100 or $200) was to go to Janet and that the
rest was to be used for child support. There was no way of knowing. Thus,
according to Judge Chasanow, Janet could not seek enforcement under the
aegis of "spousal support" but had to do so under ordinary principles of
contract law. Id. at 519-24, 644 A.2d at 519-22.





191. Id. at 517, 644 A.2d at 519. The perjury was committed for the limited purpose
of establishing adultery, which was the ground for divorce. Id. Once the
absolute divorce was granted, the perjury ceased to have any effect. Id. There
was no need for Mark and Janet to commit perjury in order to reach an
agreement on spousal support. Id. Further, the perjury had no effect on Mark's
unilateral decision to stop making support payments. Id.
192. Id. The suggestion was that, in Maskell, the falsely titled deed was also an
"accomplished fact" and was done for the "limited purpose" of providing a
residence for Maskell and his mistress. For further discussion of Maskell v.
Hill, see supra text accompanying notes 87-99. Thus, the act of falsely titling
the original deed did not affect Maskell's unilateral decision to execute a
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because Mark's unilateral decision to stop support payments occurred
after all transactions between the couple had terminated, Janet would
be left without relief absent judicial intervention.
The court also took pains to distinguish Schneider v. Schneider
and Maskell v. Hill from Baxter v. Wilburn.193 The court claimed
that in Baxter, "the taint of the transaction .. .carried over after
[the couple] had separated and prevented equity from recognizing
the lien on the mortgage."' As a result, the mistress in Baxter, who
had destroyed the mortgage, kept the property free and clear because
the court refused to intervene. 95 In Schneider, the court reasoned
that once the absolute divorce was granted, the perjury ceased to
have any further effects.'9 The benefit of the perjury was merely to
allow the parties to obtain an expedited divorce. 197 The "taint" of
the perjury did not "carry over" into the parties' spousal support
agreement. 198
By taking affirmative action, the court was convinced that it
would deter economically superior spouses from shirking their spousal
support obligations. 199 The court was correct in holding that this
concern outweighed the need to discourage perjury. 2m Non-payment
of spousal support can have long-term, adverse economic effects on
the forsaken spouse. 20 1 Perjury, solely to obtain a quick divorce, does
fraudulent conveyance some years later. Because "[n]either law nor morals
would be vindicated by permitting a man to steal his former mistress's property
by forgery perpetrated after all personal or property transactions between them
had come to an end," the court in Maskell granted relief to the former mistress.
Schneider, 335 Md. at 510, 644 A.2d at 515. "[Ilf the Court literally were to
leave the parties where they found them . . . the former mistress would be
given no relief." Id. (quoting Maskell v. Hill, 189 Md. 327, 335-36, 55 A.2d
842, 845-46 (1947)).
193. Schneider, 335 Md. at 509-10, 644 A.2d at 515.
194. Id.
195. For a discussion of Baxter v. Wilburn, see supra text accompanying notes 60-
73.
196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
199. Schneider, 335 Md. at 518, 644 A.2d at 519. The court concluded
that the dismissal of Janet's complaint would do little to discourage
perjury in divorce actions. Rather, under the facts alleged, dismissal
would be contrary to strong public policy, because dismissal would
reward the perjury of economically superior spouses by neutering their
contractual obligations of support to economically dependent spouses.
Id.
200. Id. at 516, 644 A.2d at 518.
201. Recently, a Boynton Beach, Florida man was ordered to pay $132,718 in back
child and spousal support. Trevor Jensen, Deadbeat Gets Stiff Judgment; Judge
Issues Largest Levy Ever Against Dad, SUN-SENTINEL, June 16, 1995, at 7B.
It was the largest judgment ever levied against a "deadbeat" parent in a federal
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not adversely affect the other spouse; rather, it affects the judicial
integrity of the courts. 20 2
Implicit in the majority's decision to award specific performance
of the spousal support contract was the assumption that the contract
itself was valid.203 As the dissent pointed out, "there can be no
question but that a contract based on the consideration that the
promisee will obtain a divorce, to which the parties are not entitled,
and will do so by committing and suborning perjury, is an illegal
contract. ' '204 The dissent added that "[p]romising not to include a
claim for alimony in an improperly obtained divorce is a part of the
illegality. A bargain conditional, even in part, on obtaining a perjured
divorce is not a bargain that ought to be enforced by a court of
equity.' '205
Under the dissent's view, Janet would have been left in a
precarious position because her perjury was seen as the primary
consideration given in exchange for Mark's promise to pay "$400 or
$500 every two weeks. ' '206 There would be no way for Janet to
enforce Mark's promise because it was given in exchange for illegal
consideration and was, thus, unenforceable. 20 7 Perhaps the dissent
case. Id. Similarly, a Sacramento, California man who owed $237,261 in
spousal and child support was finally captured after 10 years on the lam.
Deadbeat Dad Pleads Guilty, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 3, 1995, at B3. Since
1985, the man had avoided making required monthly spousal and child support
payments. Id. Furthermore, a sweep of "deadbeat" parents on Long Island,
New York uncovered a dentist who owed $176,000 in spousal support payments.
Alexander C. Kafka, 53 Accused as Support Deadbeats, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8,
1995, at A21. There are an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 families in Nassau
County, N.Y. who are owed support payments of some kind. Id.
202. Both parties benefit from the perjury because they are granted an absolute
divorce. The court is the only loser. Having granted a divorce on fraudulent
grounds, the court's integrity is called into question. "Judicial integrity is
endangered when judicial powers are interposed to aid persons whose very
presence before a court is the result of some fraud or inequity." Manown v.
Adams, 89 Md. App. 503, 511, 598 A.2d 821, 825 (1991), rev'd, 328 Md. 463,
615 A.2d 611 (1992). For additional discussion, see supra text accompanying
notes 33-37.
203. The majority opinion never discussed whether Mark's letter to Janet constituted
a valid contract for spousal support.
204. Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 521, 644 A.2d 510, 521 (1994).
205. Id. at 524, 644 A.2d at 522.
206. The dissent noted that "[tihe trial judge quite properly recognized that seeking
a fraudulent divorce through perjured testimony constituted part of the con-
sideration for the alleged spousal support agreement. The other part of the
consideration was foregoing any claim for alimony in the fraudulent divorce
action." Id. at 521, 644 A.2d at 520 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
207. Because the initial spousal support agreement was illegal, subsequent events
were immaterial; the support agreement was not enforceable. The court never
resolved the unclean hands issue and whether or not Janet's guilt for the
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assumed that Janet could have separated from Mark and could have
waited the required twelve months208 before filing for a legitimate
absolute divorce. This assumption would have been unfounded, how-
ever, if one accepted Janet's contention that she was pressured and
intimidated by Mark to get a "quick divorce." 2°9 Moreover, had
Janet testified truthfully, then the divorce would have been denied,
210
and Janet might have been left without spousal support. 21 ' Assuming
that Janet, due to Mark's influence, had no choice but to seek a
quick divorce through perjured testimony (if she wanted to be sure
of receiving any kind of spousal support), 2 2 her predicament became
something of a Catch-22: If she committed perjury, she got the
absolute divorce, but she could not enforce the spousal support
agreement; if she did not commit perjury, she could not get an
absolute divorce, and she ran the risk that Mark would not provide
any spousal support.
2 13
Judge Chasanow's dissenting opinion is unconvincing for two
reasons. First, it advocates a position contrary to public policy.
Courts favor the enforcement of spousal support payments as a
matter of public policy, to insure that economically superior spouses
do not breach their duty of support and to provide dependent spouses
with the means to "get back on their feet. ' 21 4 Otherwise, one spouse
perjury was as great as Mark's guilt. Id. at 508, 517, 644 A.2d at 514, 519.
Even if Janet argued that she was pressured into accepting the support
agreement, all she could have asked for was rescission of the contract, which
would have left her without spousal support.
208. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103(a)(3) (1991). Voluntary separation requires
that the parties live separate and apart, without cohabitation, before filing an
application for divorce. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying note 8.
210. Mark's uncorroborated testimony would not have sufficed. See supra note 158.
211. A court may still order alimony even if a divorce is not granted. MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 11-101 (1991). Maryland law requires that a party requesting
alimony show grounds for a divorce although it does not compel a party to
actually obtain a divorce or to prove that he could have obtained a divorce if
he had so desired. Wallace v. Wallace, 290 Md. 265, 272, 429 A.2d 232, 236
(1981). If Janet had testified truthfully, there would have been no grounds for
a divorce. Adultery was the sole ground alleged in the complaint. Schneider v.
Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 505, 644 A.2d 510, 513 (1994). Thus, the court would
have been precluded from awarding alimony, and Janet would have been left
to rely only on Mark's promise of support.
212. Because Janet's perjury also contaminated the spousal support agreement, she
could not seek to enforce it. Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 524, 644
A.2d 510, 522 (1994) (Chasanow, J., dissenting) ("A bargain conditional, even
in part, on obtaining a perjured divorce is not a bargain that ought to be
enforced by a court of equity.")
213. Given that Mark stopped making spousal support payments after the divorce
was granted, it appears unlikely that he would have made timely payments in
the absence of a divorce decree.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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could unduly pressure the other into securing a quick divorce through
perjury knowing that a court would not enforce any prior spousal
support agreement. Second, the consideration given for Mark's prom-
ise to pay "$400 or $500 every two weeks" was not Janet's perjured
testimony but, rather, was Janet's return promise not to seek alimony
from the court in a future divorce proceeding. 25 Mark did not tell
Janet that he desired a quick divorce until two days after he left the
letter, so perjury was not an issue when Janet received the letter.
216
Therefore, Janet was justified in relying on Mark's letter promising
spousal support.
21 7
Under this view, Janet's subsequent perjury was completely
separate from the agreement to pay spousal support. 2' Janet and
Mark did not "dirty their hands" in procuring the separation agree-
ment; 219 their fraudulent conduct occurred during the divorce pro-
ceeding-a completely different transaction. 220 Thus, if Mark had
raised the unclean hands defense, Janet could have rebutted the
defense by asserting that the unclean hands doctrine should not have
applied because there was no nexus between the transaction at issue
and the misconduct. 221 Both the majority and the dissent agreed that
Janet would have been entitled to relief under this scenario.2 22 Fur-
thermore, the question of whether or not Janet was in pari delicto
was not reached.?23
215. In her complaint, Janet alleged that she relied on Mark's assurances of financial
support. In so relying, she abstained from seeking alimony or other monetary
relief from Mark. Schneider v. Schneider, 96 Md. App. 296, 299, 624 A.2d
1319, 1321 (1993), rev'd, 335 Md. 500, 644 A.2d 510 (1994).
216. Schneider, 335 Md. at 504, 644 A.2d at 512; see also supra text accompanying
notes 151-53.
217. Furthermore, when Janet asked about the settlement of their property, Mark
replied that they would handle it themselves, adding: "I've already told you
what I will do. You have it in writing." Schneider, 335 Md. at 505, 644 A.2d
at 512-13. This statement indicated that Mark viewed Janet's promise not to
seek alimony as the primary consideration for his promise to pay spousal
support.
218. The majority alluded to this proposition when it stated: "Even if Janet's claim
to support rests on an agreement that also contemplated perjured grounds for
divorce, her claim for support is not [largely] dependent on the perjury .
Id. at 517, 644 A.2d at 519 (emphasis added).
219. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
221. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
222. See id. at 518, 522, 644 A.2d at 519, 521. "Janet's fall back position-which
I would agree with-is that if she can prove 'oppression' or 'great disadvantage,'
she ought to get restitution ... ." Id. at 522, 644 A.2d at 521. (Chasanow,
J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 178-79, 189.
223. The in pari delicto issue is raised only when the unclean hands doctrine is
applicable. Because the unclean hands doctrine was not applicable, it was not
necessary to decide whether Janet's guilt was equivalent to her husband's.
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Even if the perjury was in some way connected to the spousal
support agreement, 224 Janet, for policy reasons, should have the
opportunity on remand to prove that she was not in pari delicto.
225
If she can do so, she will be entitled to relief.
226
V. CONCLUSION
In Schneider v. Schneider, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
highlighted the policy of rigorously enforcing spousal support agree-
ments between husbands and wives. 227 Under Schneider, a wife, who
admits to perjury in a prior divorce action will have a chance to
specifically enforce a contract against her husband for spousal sup-
port if she can prove that her degree of guilt is lower than her
husband's. 228 Schneider's emphasis on public policy concerns, through
its resort to the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and in pari
delicto, sets a wise precedent for other jurisdictions which may be
confronted with similar cases in the future.
229
Frank J. Mastro
224. Perhaps, on remand, a court will say that Mark made a subsequent, additional
promise to keep Janet as the primary beneficiary on his two life insurance
policies in exchange for Janet's subsequent, additional promise to lie under
oath.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
227. Schneider, 335 Md. at 518, 664 A.2d at 519.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
229. No other jurisdiction has reported a case with facts similar to this one.
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